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 1 
Summary 
This graduate thesis examines if readmitting asylum seekers from EU 
member states to Georgia without first thoroughly assessing their claims 
would be illegal on the grounds that it would expose them to a real risk of ill-
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The basis of asylum law is protection based on individual grounds. This 
graduate thesis therefore studies risks of ill-treatment that would be real 
enough to render readmissions of all or certain groups of asylum seekers to 
Georgia contrary to Article 3. The main body of the graduate thesis consists 
of a study of Georgia’s treatment of asylum seekers and a study and 
application of Article 3 to Georgian circumstances. The study of Georgia’s 
treatment of asylum seekers focuses on issues pertaining to the risk of indirect 
refoulement and the risk that readmitted asylum seekers would be subjected 
to inhuman or degrading living conditions when received in Georgia.  
 
The conclusion is drawn that readmissions of asylum seekers from EU 
member states to Georgia would not give rise to a risk of indirect refoulement 
for anyone. This is based on the assessment that Georgia has the capacity to 
seriously examine asylum applications and on the fact that Georgia does not 
presently detain or deport rejected asylum seekers. The study does not 
examine how Georgian decision makers assess particular grounds for 
protection.  
 
How Article 3 should be applied to inhuman or degrading living conditions 
is very uncertain. Legal scholarship is divided on how to interpret several 
aspects of the case law and it is clear that more case law is needed in order to 
decisively decide if living conditions in Georgia would make readmissions 
there illegal. However, it is concluded, with reservations, that the readmission 
of any asylum seeker to Georgia would probably be contrary to Article 3 on 
the grounds that the capacity of the Georgian reception system is severely 
insufficient to handle the amount of asylum seekers residing in Georgia. 
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Sammanfattning 
Examensarbetet besvarar frågan om överföringar av asylsökande till 
Georgien som ännu inte fått sina asylskäl utförligt utredda skulle utsätta dem 
för en verklig risk för omänsklig eller förnedrande behandling och därmed 
vara oförenliga med Europakonventionens artikel 3. Asylrätten bygger på 
bedömningar av individuella asylskäl. I examensarbetet studeras därför 
problem i Georgien som är generella nog att ge upphov till en risk för 
omänsklig eller förnedrande behandling för hela grupper av asylsökande eller 
asylsökande i gemen. Examensarbetets huvudtext består dels av en studie av 
den georgiska asylprocessen och flyktingmottagandet och dels av en studie, 
tolkning och tillämpning av Europakonventionens artikel 3 på förhållandena 
i Georgien. Studien av Georgien rör i första hand risker för indirekt 
refoulement och omänskliga eller förnedrande levnadsvillkor. 
 
Analysen av förhållandena i Georgien och artikel 3 ger att överföringar inte 
skulle kränka artikel 3 på den grund att de skulle ge upphov till en risk för 
indirekt refoulement. Det baseras på bedömningen att de generella bristerna i 
Georgiens asylprocess inte är allvarliga nog och att Georgien i nuläget inte 
förvarstar eller deporterar de som nekats asyl. Examensarbetet utreder inte 
hur georgiska beslutsfattare bedömer särskilda typer av asylskäl. 
 
Det råder en osäkerhet kring hur artikel 3 ska tillämpas på levnadsvillkor. 
Osäkerheten gäller bland annat tillämpningen i länder utanför EU, beviskrav 
och vad som utgör levnadsvillkor. Doktrinen erbjuder olika tolkningar i dessa 
frågor och det behövs fler utlåtanden från Europadomstolen för att ett 
definitivt svar ska kunna ges på frågan om levnadsvillkoren för asylsökande 
i Georgien medför att överföringar kränker artikel 3. Med denna osäkerhet i 
åtanke dras den försiktiga slutsatsen att överföringar förmodligen skulle strida 
mot artikel 3 på grund av Georgiens mycket otillräckliga 
mottagningskapacitet och de svåra levnadsvillkor som detta kan väntas 
medföra för många av de som blir överförda. 
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Abbreviations and short forms 
Article 3 Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 
 
The Convention The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The Court  The European Court of Human Rights 
 
EU  European Union 
 
GYLA  Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association 
 
IOM  International Organization for Migration 
 
LLSA  Law of Georgia on the Legal Status of Aliens 
  and Stateless Persons 
 
LRHS Law of Georgia on Refugee and Humanitarian 
Status 
 
MIA  Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia 
 
MRA Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the 
Occupied Territories, Accommodation and 
Refugees of Georgia 
 
UNAG United Nations Association of Georgia 
 
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Public debate on the migration policies at work at the EU borders has 
intensified during the last few years. The annually recurring tragedy of 
migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea has put in focus the question 
what the right to seek asylum constitutes, and in which countries an asylum 
seeker1 can make use of this right. According to its most widespread 
interpretation, the right to seek asylum does not comprise a right to receive a 
visa for that purpose, leaving many asylum seekers who wish to enter foreign 
countries with no other entry options than illegal ones. This has led actors 
who want to limit asylum migration to employ policies that hinder asylum 
seekers from entering their territories. The EU is one such actor, and the 
present EU policies of a restrictive visa regime, strict border controls and 
cooperation with states in the neighbourhood on migration issues work in 
concert to restrict asylum seekers’ access to Europe and as a consequence to 
the European asylum procedures.2 
 
Access to the asylum procedure can also be restricted for asylum seekers who 
have already succeeded in entering the state in which they would prefer to file 
their asylum application. One such method is the employment of the safe third 
country concept. According to the concept, a country that receives an asylum 
seeker who has fled his or her country of origin by transiting through another 
country where he or she could have applied for asylum is allowed to send 
back the asylum seeker to that safe third transit country without thoroughly 
examining the asylum seeker’s application. The basis for this concept is rather 
                                                 
1 In this graduate thesis, the term asylum seeker will be applied to a person who intends to 
seek asylum or who is registered as an asylum seeker until his application for asylum has 
been granted or finally rejected. 
2 See e.g. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway (2014): Non-Refoulement in 
a World of Cooperative Deterrence. 2 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 235–284; 
Cathryn Costello (20121): Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational 
Jurisprudence Explored. 12:2 Human Rights Law Review 287–339; Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen (2014): International Refugee Law and Refugee Policy: The Case of Deterrence 
Policies. 27:4 Journal of Refugee Studies 574–595. 
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weak and comes from the prohibition in Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention against imposing penalties on asylum seekers who migrate 
irregularly. According to Article 31, states should not penalise the irregular 
entry or presence of refugees ‘coming directly from a territory where their 
life or freedom was threatened’ if they present themselves to the authorities 
without delay and show good cause for the illegal entry or presence. This has 
been interpreted as meaning that asylum seekers only have a right to apply 
for asylum in the first safe country they arrive in.3 
 
The safe third country concept is widely employed within the EU, where it 
forms the basis of the Dublin readmissions. However, EU law also envisions 
readmissions of third-country nationals to countries outside Dublin space. 
The new Procedures Directive4 that went into effect on 21 July 2015 retains 
the concept of European safe third countries as well as regular safe third 
countries. According to the new Procedures Directive, a country is considered 
a European safe third country if it has ratified and observes the provisions in 
the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights and 
has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law.5 The use of the European 
safe third country concept is less restricted than the use of the safe third 
country concept.6 Unlike under the former Procedures Directive, it is now up 
to each member state to decide what countries to consider European safe third 
countries.7 Georgia is one of the countries outside of the EU that has ratified 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee 
Convention with the 1967 protocol. 
 
                                                 
3 Cathryn Costello (2005): The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe 
Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of International 
Protection? 7 European Journal of Migration and Law 35–69, p. 40. 
4 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection [2013] OJ 
L180/60. 
5 Art. 39 of the 2013 Procedures Directive. 
6 Arts. 38 and 39 of the 2013 Procedures Directive. 
7 Art. 36 (2d) Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards 
on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status [2005] OJ 
L326/13; Art. 39 of the 2013 Procedures Directive. 
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EU and Georgia base their deepening cooperation on the movement of people 
on the Mobility Partnership that was launched in 2010. EU and Georgia have 
since then agreed to facilitate visa issuance and are now in a visa liberalisation 
process that may lead to short-term visa free travel for Georgians who want 
to visit the EU. EU nationals are already able to travel to Georgia visa free 
since 2006.8  On March 1 2011, the EU-Georgia readmission agreement9 went 
into effect, which obliges the parties to receive nationals residing illegally on 
the other party’s territory.10 With some exceptions, the readmission 
agreement also obliges the parties to receive third-country nationals who are 
illegally residing on the other party’s territory if they illegally and directly 
entered that territory after having stayed on, or transited through, the first 
party’s territory.11 It also obliges a party to receive illegally residing third-
country nationals who possess a valid visa issued by that party.12 
 
The visa liberalisation process does not only presuppose a readmission 
agreement,13 but requires changes that affect most aspects of Georgian 
migration policy and border control. The Georgian Young Lawyer’s 
Association (GYLA) has said that the EU and its requests have been a more 
important factor behind the rapid development of Georgia’s migration 
policies than any reform desire from the Georgian government.14 
 
Most asylum seekers arrive to the EU through other states than Georgia. 
However, even if to a smaller degree, Georgia is a transit country for asylum 
seekers trying to reach and apply for asylum in the EU.15 Those asylum 
                                                 
8 The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (2013): Georgia and Migration Policy 
Analysis, p. 8–9. 
9 Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorisation (The European Union-Georgia). Signed 22 November 2010, 
entered into force 1 March 2011. 
10 The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (2013): Georgia and Migration Policy 
Analysis, p. 9, 12; Arts. 2 and 4 of the EU-Georgia Readmission Agreement. 
11 Arts. 3 (1b) and 5 (1b) of the EU-Georgia readmission agreement. 
12 Arts. 3 (1a) and 5 (1a) of the EU-Georgia readmission agreement. 
13 The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (2013): Georgia and Migration Policy 
Analysis, p. 9. 
14 The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (2013): Georgia and Migration Policy 
Analysis, p. 7, 12. 
15 The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (2013): Georgia and Migration Policy 
Analysis, p. 12, 17. 
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seekers are not readmitted to Georgia today. While the all-time number of 
requests to Georgia to readmit Georgian nationals under the readmission 
agreement had reached 3584 at the end of August 2014,16 EU member states 
have so far only requested the readmission of five third-country nationals. 
Georgia granted the four requests that concerned Russian Chechens who 
already possessed Georgian residence permits. Georgia rejected the fifth 
readmission request from Poland that concerned a Kenyan national, as she 
had only transited Georgia through Tbilisi International Airport.17  
 
The practice of readmitting third-country nationals from EU member states 
to the European neighbourhood and Georgia could change quickly in the 
future. EU legislation has opened up for such readmissions and the EU-
Georgia readmission agreement has made them practical. What is required is 
a policy change in some EU member states and an assessment in those 
countries that Georgia is a safe third country. Georgia’s migration policies 
have undergone rapid change during the last few years with pressure and 
assistance from the EU. Nevertheless, is Georgia ready to receive and provide 
protection to readmitted asylum seekers in accordance with international law?  
 
1.2 Purpose and Scope 
This graduate thesis examines the legality of readmitting asylum seekers from 
EU member states to Georgia today, without first thoroughly assessing their 
claims. There are several different treaties ratified by all EU member states 
that contain international obligations that concern readmissions. Community 
law contains such obligations as well. This graduate thesis however, is limited 
to a study of the obligations that stem from Article 3 (hereafter: Article 3) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter: the Convention). The 
Convention with Article 3 has arguably been the most successful supra-
                                                 
16 International Organization for Migration (2014): Readmission to Georgia Issue # 3. 
Published September 2014. Newsletter. P, 3. 
17 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview 19 June 2015; According to Art. 3 (2a) of 
the EU-Georgia Readmission Agreement, Georgia has no obligation to receive a person in 
this situation. 
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national legal instrument in Europe for challenging deportations and it is 
therefore reasonable to focus a study on Article 3 alone.  
 
Article 3 alone and in concert with Article 13 of the Convention does not only 
prohibit state parties to deport a person when substantial grounds have been 
shown that this will expose the person to a real risk of ill-treatment. They also 
create procedural obligations. This graduate thesis will not comprise a study 
of whether EU member states fulfil their procedural obligations under Article 
3 and Article 13, but will instead focus on establishing if there are substantial 
grounds to believe that readmissions to Georgia will expose people to a real 
risk of ill-treatment. 
 
Individual claims and assessments of individual protection needs are the basis 
of asylum law. This graduate thesis will focus on bigger issues in Georgia that 
may call into question the legality of readmitting all asylum seekers to 
Georgia our certain groups of asylum seekers.  
 
Moreover, the study in this graduate thesis will only concern asylum seekers 
whose asylum applications are not considered manifestly unfounded on the 
grounds that they do not have a protection need.  
 
1.2.1 Research Question 
Having the above delimitations in mind, the research question of this graduate 
thesis is phrased as follows: 
 
- Are there substantial grounds to believe that all or certain groups of asylum 
seekers readmitted from the EU to Georgia today, without first having their 
asylum claims assessed thoroughly, face a real risk of being subjected to ill-
treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention? 
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1.3 Method 
In order to assess if it is contrary to Article 3 to readmit asylum seekers to 
Georgia, it has been necessary to study the treatment of asylum seekers in 
Georgia and to interpret and apply Article 3 to that situation in a readmission 
context. To focus the study of the situation in Georgia, it has also been 
necessary to make a prima facie assessment of what in Georgia’s treatment 
of asylum seekers could give rise to a risk of ill-treatment.  
 
The inspiration for what issues to look for in Georgia has been the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (hereafter: the Court) case law. The areas in which 
the Court has found violations of Article 3 in readmission cases can be 
divided, and are divided by the Court, into indirect refoulement, detention 
conditions and living conditions. There are of course other issues under 
Article 3 that may affect a large number of asylum seekers readmitted to a 
certain country. For example, until a few years ago Georgia was still passing 
substantial jail sentences on asylum seekers who illegally crossed its border.18 
However, this study of the treatment of asylum seekers in Georgia has 
focused on and exclusively found issues pertaining to either indirect 
refoulement, detention conditions or living conditions. 
 
In order to determine the facts, the Court ‘will assess all the material placed 
before it and, if necessary, material obtained of its own motion’.19 The rules 
that govern the Court have largely given it free reign in how it gathers and 
assesses evidence. For example, the Court can carry out on-site 
investigations20 and ask experts and institutions to express opinions or write 
reports regarding matters relevant to the case.21 The Court may quite 
generally ‘adopt any investigative measure which it considers capable of 
                                                 
18 Migreurop (2013): Country profile Georgia (www). Retrieved from migreurop, 
http://www.migreurop.org/article2195.html?lang=fr. Published 3 January 2013. Retrieved 
30 July 2015. 
19 Vilvarajah and others v. The United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, para. 
107. 
20 European Court of Human Rights Rules of Court of 1 June 2015, rule A1 (3). Accessible 
from http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf. Retrieved 30 July 2015. 
21 European Court of Human Rights Rules of Court of 1 June 2015, rule A1 (2). 
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clarifying the facts of the case’.22 There is therefore a multitude of relevant 
primary and secondary sources for determining risks of ill-treatment in 
readmission cases. That the Court has mostly relied on secondary sources like 
reports from different international institutions and NGOs in those cases,23 
does not necessarily mean that the Court considers those sources to be more 
reliable than others. Fact-finding through reports is quicker and less 
expensive for the Court than conducting investigations on its own accord.24 
What is important is that the gathered sources are able to show substantial 
grounds for the risk of ill-treatment. 
 
GYLA published two reports on Georgian asylum law and migration policies 
in 2013. However, these reports mostly contain a reiteration of Georgian 
legislation and government policy and no critical analysis as to the conformity 
of Georgian asylum law and practice to Georgia’s human rights obligations. 
Furthermore, Georgia’s migration policies have undergone extensive changes 
during recent years. The reports written by the EU delegations sent to Georgia 
to study the progress made in relation to the VLAP are more recent and 
contain some critical observations. However, these studies are not very 
extensive and they are not academic studies. Moreover, the context of the visa 
liberalisation dialogue is very political. As to other available sources of 
information, UNHCR provides some statistics about the amount of asylum 
seekers in Georgia and Georgia’s recognition rate. Moreover, most of the 
relevant Georgian legislation has been translated to English. 
 
To assess how Georgia treats asylum seekers, it has therefore been necessary 
to gather a lot of information. Most material in this part of the graduate thesis 
has come from interviews conducted with people representing different 
organisations who work with migration in Georgia. The different actors 
interviewed are the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the 
                                                 
22 European Court of Human Rights Rules of Court of 1 June 2015, rule A1 (1). 
23 Katayoun C. Sadeghi (2009): The Problematic Nature of the Court’s Reliance on 
Secondary Sources for Fact-Finding. 25 Connecticut Journal of International Law 127–
151, p. 127–128, 133. 
24 Katayoun C. Sadeghi (2009), p. 127. 
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Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia (the MRA), 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (the MIA), United Nations 
Association of Georgia (UNAG), the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and GYLA. These parties all have different positions in the 
Georgian asylum procedure and the questions posed have mostly been posed 
to several of them in order to get as comprehensive and unbiased answers as 
possible. Moreover, the focus of the interviews has been to establish 
verifiable facts about the Georgian asylum procedure and Georgian reception 
conditions and not opinions about their qualities. The fact-finding has also 
comprised a visit to Georgia’s only detention facility for migrants and a 
request for public information from the MRA. There are notes from the 
interviews but no recordings. However, the correctness of the referenced 
information has been verified by e-mail. 
 
The Convention and its articles are phrased in very general terms and the 
content of them can only be well understood by studying the Court’s 
extensive and well developed case law. The Court interprets the Convention 
and sets precedents.25 The Court has adjudicated readmission cases on several 
occasions, and the graduate thesis’ study of Article 3 will therefore rest 
heavily on that case law. If the Court has not clearly addressed a particular 
issue, it is necessary to interpret its case law. If the Court has assigned 
particular importance to a particular principle of interpretation in a case, that 
could give guidance as to how Article 3 is to be interpreted in a case in a 
similar context.26 
 
Legal scholars certainly offer good commentary on how the Court’s case law 
should be interpreted. However, one should be aware both as a reader and a 
writer that asylum law is a controversial area of law that evokes a lot of 
emotion. The legality of deportation is not the centrepiece of all commentary. 
                                                 
25 Article 32 of the Convention. 
26 For a summary on how the Court interprets the Convention, see Bernadette Rainey & 
Elizabeth Wicks & Clare Ovey (2014): The European Convention on Human Rights (6th 
edn). Oxford University Press, Chapter 4. 
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Is can be confused with ought and conclusions are sometimes influenced by 
wishful thinking. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
The graduate thesis is introduced with a critical study of how Georgia treats 
asylum seekers (Chapter 2). The study covers issues that may alone or in 
concert give rise to a real risk of ill-treatment were asylum seekers readmitted 
to Georgia. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on 
issues pertaining to the risk of indirect refoulement, the second on the 
detention of asylum seekers and the third on their living conditions. 
 
The first part of Chapter 3 contains an introduction to the general application 
of Article 3 in non-refoulement cases. The rest of Chapter 3 is divided into 
two parts relating to issues of indirect refoulement and living conditions. 
These two parts each contain an analysis of Article 3 and an application of 
Article 3 to readmissions to Georgia. No part relates to issues of detention, as 
the study in Chapter 2 did not identify any.  
 
Chapter 4 concludes the graduate thesis by providing an answer to the 
research question posed in Chapter 1.2.1. 
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2 Treatment of Asylum Seekers 
in Georgia 
2.1 Issues that May Cause a Risk of 
Indirect Refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement is the prohibition in asylum law to turn 
someone fearing persecution or other ill-treatment over to those who would 
inflict it upon him. In this graduate thesis, non-refoulement is interpreted as 
the obligation not to deport a person in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 
Indirect refoulement is to turn over an asylum seeker to an intermediary state 
who in turn turns the asylum seeker over to someone who would subject him 
to ill-treatment. There is a risk of indirect refoulement if an asylum seeker is 
deported to an intermediary country that deports asylum seekers without 
making a sufficient assessment of their claims. This will be expanded on in 
Chapter 3. 
 
2.1.1 Access to the Asylum Procedure 
According to Article 11 (2) of the Law of Georgia on Refugee and 
Humanitarian Status (LRHS), 27 an asylum seeker who illegally crosses the 
border into Georgia has to report this to the Georgian authorities at the very 
first encounter and within 24 hours from crossing the border. Otherwise, the 
asylum seeker’s registration as an asylum seeker is to be rejected.28 If the 
asylum seeker can show that the delay was due to circumstances outside his 
or her control, the 24-hour time limit is prolonged for as long as the 
circumstances remain.29 The 24-hour time limit is short, and it has to be 
assumed that many asylum seekers crossing the border into Georgia illegally 
will fail to report their illegal border crossing in time solely because they lack 
                                                 
27 All English citations from this law are excerpts from the unofficial translation of the law 
that is available on the MRA’s official webpage http://mra.gov.ge/eng/static/709. Accessed 
3 August 2015. 
28 Art. 13 (1b) LRHS. 
29 Art. 11 (3) LRHS. 
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knowledge about the legislation. Moreover, an asylum seeker that wishes to 
travel further to Europe may not intend to contact Georgian authorities. If an 
asylum seeker does not apply for asylum in Georgia before applying for 
asylum in the EU and is readmitted, Georgian law would most likely not 
accept his or her registration as an asylum seeker in Georgia. The delay will 
not be a result of circumstances outside the asylum seeker’s control.  
 
The European Commission criticised the 24-hour time limit in its first Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) report.30 The Georgian authorities’ reply 
to this critique can be found in the second VLAP report, where they stated 
that Article 11 (2) LRHS is not applied in practice.31  According to a 
representative of GYLA, this is indeed the case.32  
 
From January to June this year, 18 people crossed the Georgian border 
illegally and then reported to the authorities that they wished to apply for 
asylum.33 
 
2.1.2 Status Determination Procedures, 
Decisions and Judgments 
The MRA is responsible for assessing and making decisions on asylum 
applications.34 The ministry employs nine decision makers and since 2014, 
there are three people working in a dedicated country of origin information 
unit.35 Decision-makers can pose questions to the country of origin 
                                                 
30 European Commission (2013): First Progress Report on the implementation by Georgia 
of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council. COM(2013) 808 final, 15 November 2013, p. 13. 
31 European Commission (2014): Second Progress Report on the implementation by 
Georgia of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council. COM(2014) 681 final, 29 October 2014, p. 3. 
32 Representative of GYLA (2015). Interview 22 May 2015. 
33 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation 
and Refugees of Georgia (2015): Reply to request for public information received on 22 
June 2015. N 04/07/18182. 
34 Art. 24 LRHS. 
35 European Commission (2015): Commission staff working document accompanying the 
document Third Progress Report on Georgia's implementation of the action plan on visa 
liberalisation: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 
SWD(2015) 103 final, 8 May 2015, p. 11–12. 
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information unit, which mostly bases its answers on international English 
sources.36 There seems to be a consensus that the procedures for interviewing 
asylum seekers and determining their identity have improved a lot during the 
last few years.37 In normal cases, the main interview with an asylum seeker 
will last around two or three hours.38 According to UNAG however, 
interviews are still far from meeting international standards. The staff 
conducting the interviews will sometimes not pose important follow-up 
questions and the quality of the interviews seems to be higher when they are 
monitored.39 According to the Commission staff working document 
accompanying the third VLAP report, Georgia’s refugee status determination 
procedure is of sufficient quality. The same working document found that the 
MRA’s decisions contain detailed reasoning about law and facts and 
information about available remedies.40  
 
Asylum seekers are entitled to use the services of an interpreter at the 
interviews conducted by the MRA.41 This right is upheld in practice as well.42 
Providing interpretation in a language that the asylum seeker understands well 
is generally not an issue,43 although the quality of the interpretation can 
sometimes be lacking.44  
 
Judges in Georgia receive some training in asylum law. According to UNAG, 
a few Georgian judges are well familiar with asylum law, but more judges 
than those adjudicate asylum cases. Some of them are not familiar with basic 
asylum law concepts like internal flight alternatives or persecution. Most 
                                                 
36 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview 9 June 2015. 
37 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview; Representative of GYLA (2015). 
Interview; European Commission (2015), p. 12. 
38 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview 16 June 2015. 
39 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview; UNHCR and UNAG have access to the 
interviews and the right to pose questions themselves. 
40 European Commission (2015), p. 12. 
41 Article 18 (1a) LRHS. 
42 Representative of GYLA (2015). Interview.  
43 Representative of GYLA (2015). Interview; Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
44 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
 17 
judgments are of a standard character and only contain the parties’ arguments, 
a very extensive recital of legislation and the decision itself.45 
 
MRA’s standard time limit for making decisions on asylum applications is 
six months. Due to the high amount of asylum applications filed as of late, 
the MRA is making use of an option to prolong this time with an additional 
three months.46 All appeals included, it might take a year or a year and a half 
for an asylum seeker to get a final rejection.47 
 
2.1.3 Protection Statuses and Protection 
Against Refoulement 
The LRHS went into force in 2012.48 According to the LRHS, asylum seekers 
can be granted either refugee status or humanitarian status. According to 
Article 4 (1b) LRHS, an asylum seeker will receive humanitarian status if he 
or she ‘cannot be returned to the country of origin because of legal 
requirements, namely, international responsibilities undertaken by Georgia 
(stipulated in article 249  of the Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of 
torture, inhumane treatment or punishment)…’. Articles 3 (1) and 4 (3) LRHS 
contains exceptions to when refugee and humanitarian status should be 
granted. An asylum seeker is not entitled to humanitarian or refugee status if 
he or she ‘may, based on a reasonable assumption, create a threat to state 
security, territorial integrity as well as to the public order of Georgia’ or if 
‘his/her presence in Georgia is conflicting with the interests of this country 
for any significant reason’.  
 
These exceptions are applied in practice. When the MRA has registered an 
asylum seeker, it sends the case to the MIA for a security check. If the MIA 
decides that an asylum seeker can be of concern to national security, it sends 
                                                 
45 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
46 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview.  
47 Representative of the MRA (2015). E-mail received 27 July 2015. 
48 Article 36 LRHS. 
49 The original Georgian document correctly refers to Article 3 of the Convention. 
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back a negative recommendation. The MRA will then reject the asylum 
application.50 The information that security recommendations are based on is 
classified and it is not shared with applicants or their legal counsel.51 Asylum 
seekers therefore have their asylum applications rejected without knowing the 
grounds for rejection and concomitantly do not possess any effective means 
to appeal the negative decision on their asylum application.  
 
According to the Commission staff working document accompanying the 
third VLAP report that was published 8 May this year, the MIA sent back a 
negative security advice in 193 out of 703 or 24.5 % of cases during an 
undefined period. In 178 out of the 193 cases, no grounded arguments 
supplemented the negative security advice.52 As to the amount of applications 
that receive a negative security advice, it is reportedly lower in 2015 than in 
2014.53 According to public information requested from the MRA, 16 out of 
233 or 6.9 % of cases were rejected from January to June this year because of 
security concerns.54 The MIA gives negative security recommendations to a 
higher extent in cases regarding certain nationalities. Iranians are one group 
that still receives a very high amount of negative security recommendations.55  
 
According to the MRA, a negative security recommendation from the MIA 
will not result in an applicant’s asylum application not being examined. If an 
asylum application is rejected because of security concerns, it will still be 
clear from the decision if the applicant risks ill-treatment if deported.56 
However, people with protection needs that have their asylum applications 
rejected because of security concerns do not receive a protection status. Their 
stay in Georgia is illegal and they will therefore not enjoy any social rights. 
                                                 
50 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
51 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview; Representatives of UNAG (2015). 
Interview. 
52 European Commission (2015), p. 11. 
53 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
54 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation 
and Refugees of Georgia (2015): Reply to request for public information received on 22 
June 2015. 
55 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
56 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
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A proposal for new legislation is being written, which will most likely correct 
this issue and grant the people concerned some kind of protection.57 
 
Article 21 LRHS contains a prohibition against refoulement. Article 21 (3) 
prohibits the deportation of people who hold refugee or humanitarian status 
if there is a reasonable risk that they will be subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment upon their return. Article 21 (2) LRHS prohibits the 
return of asylum seekers until their case has been tried and the final decision 
entered into force. However, the law does not protect people whose claims 
are rejected for security reasons, but still fear inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment upon their return to their home countries. Refoulement is also 
regulated in the Law of Georgia on the Legal Status of Aliens and Stateless 
Persons (LLSA)58. Art. 59 (2) LLSA does not expressly prohibit the 
deportation of a person to a country where the person fears inhuman or 
degrading treatment, but does prohibit deportation if the person’s life or 
health is threatened. It also prohibits the deportation of people that are entitled 
to protection according to the refugee convention. As Georgia has not yet, or 
at least not during recent times, carried out any deportations of asylum 
seekers,59 it is not clear how Georgian legislation would protect people 
fearing ill-treatment who have had their asylum applications rejected because 
of security concerns. According to an MRA representative, Georgia would 
not deport anyone fearing ill-treatment.60 
 
2.1.4 Recognition Rates 
According to the annexes to UNHCR’s 2013 Global Trends Report, 301 
asylum cases were decided finally in Georgia that year. In 66 of these cases, 
the asylum seeker received either refugee or humanitarian status, which gives 
                                                 
57 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
58 An English translation of this law is available on the webpage of the Legislative Herald 
of Georgia at https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/2278806?impose=translateEn.  
Accessed 3 August 2015. 
59 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview. 
60 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
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a recognition rate of 21.9 %.61 According to the annexes to UNHCR’s 2014 
Global Trends Report, the MRA made a decision in 366 asylum cases in 
Georgia that year. In 138 of these cases, the asylum seeker received either 
refugee or humanitarian status, which gives a recognition rate of 37.7 % at 
first instance. The appeal courts made a decision in 49 asylum cases and the 
decision was positive in 16 of them. This gives a change rate of 32.7 %. The 
recognition rate in 2014 for Iranians and Azerbaijanis was 0 %.62 
 
2.1.5 Deportation in Practice 
The MIA and the courts both make decisions on deportations. The MIA 
generally makes decisions that regard rejected asylum seekers. The MIA’s 
decisions can be appealed to a court within 10 days and then appealed again 
to an appellate court.63 
 
As of today, Georgia has concluded readmission agreements with the EU, 
Denmark, Moldova, Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine.64 Georgia is 
negotiating readmission agreements with Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Serbia and has proposed negotiations on readmission 
agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, India, Israel, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka.65  Negotiations with Bangladesh and India have reportedly 
been unsuccessful.66 There are also plans to start negotiations on readmission 
agreements with Algeria, China, Iran, Nepal, Nigeria and Turkey.67 
 
Georgia does not have a tradition of deporting foreigners. The reason for this 
has been a lack of infrastructure, a lack of allocated resources and a lack of 
                                                 
61 UNHCR (2014): Global Trends 2013 data tables v3 ext (1) (excel document). Retrieved 
from https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2013-global-
trends/Global_Trends_2013_data_tables_v3_ext.xls. Published online with UNHCR Global 
Trends 2013 20 June 2014. Retrieved 30 July 2015. Annex table 10.  
62 European Commission (2015), p. 12. 
63 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview. 
64 European Commission (2015), p. 7. 
65 European Commission (2015), p. 8. 
66 Representative of IOM (2015). Interview 1 June 2015. 
67 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview. 
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readmission agreements. Forced returns have not been a priority.68 Georgia 
has recently allocated more resources to identifying and finding irregular 
migrants and opened its first detention facility for migrants in March this 
year.69 Between 1 March and 1 June, the MIA detained five people in this 
facility.70 The systems that were created to identify and find irregular 
migrants by coordinating information between ministries were going to be 
put online 1 July this year, at the same time as the transition rules in the new 
LLSA turned obsolete.71 Since then three more people have been detained in 
the detention facility.72 According to the MIA, the five people who were 
originally detained were all detained because their identity could not be 
determined. They were not asylum seekers, although one of them applied for 
asylum in detention and was therefore released.73 Two of the three recently 
detained people are not rejected asylum seekers but convicted criminals. The 
story of the third recently detained person is unknown to the author, but it is 
quite clear that Georgia has not started to detain rejected asylum seekers.74 
 
Even if Georgia would start to detain rejected asylum seekers, this would not 
necessarily result in a big increase of deportations. Due to a lack of 
readmission agreements with important countries of origin, Georgian 
authorities might have trouble carrying out their deportation orders. As of 
today, there have been a few cases of assisted voluntary return supported by 
the IOM.75 The MIA had received a laissez-passer for the detainee concerned 
in one of these cases and would have deported him if he had not opted to 
accept to return with the aid of the IOM.76 
                                                 
68 The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (2013): Georgia and Migration Policy 
Analysis, p. 35. 
69 European Commission (2015), p. 9–10. 
70 Representative of IOM (2015). Interview; Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview. 
71 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview. 
72 Representative of IOM (2015). E-mail received 20 July 2015. 
73 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview. 
74 Representative of IOM (2015). E-mail received 22 July 2015. 
75 Representative of IOM (2015). Interview. 
76 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview; Representative of IOM (2015). E-mail 
received 20 July 2015. 
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2.2 Detention of Asylum Seekers 
Unlike many EU member states, Georgia does not have a practice of detaining 
asylum seekers. This is clear from Chapter 2.1.5. There are no indications that 
asylum seekers would be summarily detained if they were readmitted to 
Georgia. Of course, without any readmissions to this date, one cannot say 
much about future practices regarding readmitted asylum seekers specifically.  
 
If readmitted asylum seekers were detained, they would be detained at 
Georgia’s first detention facility for people illegally residing in Georgia that 
was opened in March this year.77 Some of the dormitories for single adults 
seem to comprise less than three square meters per bed, judging from the 
MIA’s own photographs.78 The dormitories that were shown to the author in 
person looked to have considerably more space per bed, the amount of beds 
having seemingly been cut in half.79 However, with the capacity to 
accommodate 80 single adults and 4 families, and the detainees held there at 
present only amounting to a few,80 any potential risks of overcrowding lie far 
ahead in the future. The conditions in the detention facility are monitored by 
the Public Defender of Georgia, which has yet to release its first monitoring 
report.81 
 
At present, there are no indications that asylum seekers in general face a real 
risk of being detained if they are returned to Georgia. Moreover, there is 
nothing that indicates that those conditions would constitute ill-treatment. 
Chapter 3 will therefore contain no part discussing the conformity of 
detention conditions with Article 3. 
                                                 
77 European Commission (2015), p. 10. 
78 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (2014): Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Internal Affairs of Georgia Opened the Temporary Accommodation Center of the 
Migration Department (www). Retrieved from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, 
http://www.police.ge/en/saqartvelos-premier-ministrma-da-shinagan-saqmeta-ministrma-
migratsiis-departamentis-droebiti-gantavsebis-tsentri-gakhsnes/7220. Published 8 October 
2014. Retrieved 29 July 2015. 
79 Tour of the Temporary Accommodation Centre. 19 June 2015. 
80 Representative of the MIA (2015). Interview. 
81 Reports are available at http://www.ombudsman.ge/en/reports/national-preventive-
mechanism-reports/reports-after-the-visit.  
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2.3 Living Conditions of Asylum Seekers 
According to the LRHS, asylum seekers have the right to live in a reception 
centre or other temporary accommodation provided by the MRA free of 
charge.82 Asylum seekers are primarily accommodated in the country’s only 
reception centre in Martkopi, which can accommodate a maximum of 60 
people.83 A new building with the capacity to accommodate another 72 people 
is being constructed beside the old building.84 UNAG considers the 
conditions at Martkopi to be acceptable and the capacity of the reception 
centre was sufficient for Georgia’s needs when it was built a few years ago. 
However, since then immigration has outgrown the reception centre’s 
capacity.85  
 
The 60 available places at Martkopi are not nearly sufficient to accommodate 
everyone who seeks asylum in Georgia. At the start of 2014, there were 380 
pending asylum applications and at the end of 2014, the backlog of pending 
asylum applications had increased to 1257.86 Even if each asylum application 
had only regarded a single person, the places at Martkopi would have been 
sufficient to accommodate less than 5 % of all people within the Georgian 
asylum process by the turn of the year. Georgia received 1792 asylum 
applications in 201487, which is a considerably higher amount than the 716 
asylum applications that were filed in Georgia in 2013.88 The pressure on 
Georgia’s reception capacity will however still be high this year with around 
600 asylum applications having been filed during the first six months of 
2015.89 Single mothers, ill people and other vulnerable people are given 
priority for accommodation at Martkopi.90 
                                                 
82 Art. 18 (2) LRHS. 
83 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
84 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
85 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
86 UNHCR (2015): UNHCR Global Trends 2014 Annexes (zip-file). Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends/2014-GlobalTrends-annex-tables.zip. Published online 
with UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014 19 June 2015. Retrieved 30 
July 2015. Annex table 10. 
87 UNHCR (2015), annex table 10. 
88 UNHCR (2014), annex table 10. 
89 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
90 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
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Asylum seekers who do not receive accommodation at the reception centre 
can still receive other forms of aid, including assistance to pay rent for an 
apartment and other social assistance and medical aid, if they are in need of 
support.91 Support for renting apartments ranges from 280 to 480 GEL92 a 
month and depends on the size of the supported family.93 Asylum seekers in 
need of support can also receive a monthly allowance of 80 GEL plus 60 GEL 
per family member. Protection status holders on the other hand, are entitled 
to a monthly allowance of 45 GEL.94 A commission at the MRA assesses 
applications from both protection status holders and asylum seekers and 
decides if they are in need of support or if they have other means to support 
themselves.95 The MRA’s statistics on the matter do not differentiate between 
the two groups. Moreover, it does not differentiate between the type of 
support requested or given. According to the MRA, this is because people 
who request aid often do not specify the aid they need themselves.96 
 
The Commission was set up in January this year and assessed 238 
applications from February to June. It granted aid in 60 of these cases and 
refused aid in 164 of them. 50 of the positive replies regarded families and 
the other 10 replies regarded single adults. According to the MRA, the same 
people often apply more than once.97 According to an MRA representative, 
the MRA’s funds are not sufficient to meet all needs and therefore only people 
who are in need of financial support the most receive it.98 Both representatives 
at GYLA and UNAG have the impression that financial support to asylum 
                                                 
91 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview; Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons 
from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia (2015): Reply to 
request for public information received on 22 June 2015. 
92 As of 30 July 2015, 1 EUR roughly equals 2.5 GEL and 1 SEK roughly equals 0.26 GEL. 
93 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
94 Representative of the MRA (2015): E-mail received 27 July 2015. 
95 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
96 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation 
and Refugees of Georgia (2015): Reply to request for public information received on 22 
June 2015. 
97 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation 
and Refugees of Georgia (2015): Reply to request for public information received on 22 
June 2015; The remaining 14 cases are unaccounted for in the statistics in the MRA’s reply. 
98 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
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seekers is rare.99 Moreover, UNAG has the impression that the financial 
support that is provided is mainly provided to people who have received a 
protection status and not to asylum seekers.100 
 
Since January this year, Georgia offers all asylum seekers access to basic 
healthcare.101 Asylum seekers also have the right to work in Georgia after 
they have received a temporary identity card,102 but because of poor Georgian 
language skills and a difficult labour market, they have trouble finding 
work.103 Asylum seekers also lack the necessary connections. The official 
unemployment rate in Georgia was 12.4 % in 2014.104 According to a 
National Democratic Institute survey in August 2014, 61 % of the people 
interviewed were either employed or unemployed and looking for work. Of 
those people, 52 % were employed and 48 % were unemployed and looking 
for work.105 The difference is explained by the methodology used by the 
National Statistics Office of Georgia that for example counts subsistence 
farmers and people trying to sell various objects or fruit on the street as self-
employed even if they are looking for actual employment and are doing what 
they do to be able to put food on their table.106 
 
According to UNAG, no organisation monitors the living conditions of 
asylum seekers that are not provided with accommodation by the state.107 
                                                 
99 Representative of GYLA (2015). Interview; Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
100 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
101 Art. 18 (f) LHRS; European Commission (2015), p. 12. 
102 European Commission (2015), p. 13. 
103 Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
104 National Statistics Office of Georgia (GEOSTAT) (2015): Employment and 
Unemployment 2014 (Annual) (pdf-document). Retrieved from 
http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/labour/employment%20and%20unem
ployment%202014%20press%20release.pdf. Published 27 May 2015. Retrieved 29 July 
2015. 
105 National Democratic Institute (2014): Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a August 
2014 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC-Georgia (pdf-document). Retrieved from 
https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Georgia_August-2014-survey_Public-Issues_ENG_vf.pdf. 
Published 25 August 2014. Retrieved 29 July 2015. 
106 National Statistics Office of Georgia (GEOSTAT) (2015): Labour Force Statistics (pdf-
document). Retrieved from 
http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/methodology/labour%20force%20sta
tistics%20Eng.pdf. Retrieved 29 July 2015.  
107 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
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Judging from the statement that mostly protection status holders are the ones 
who receive aid, the absolute majority of asylum seekers in Georgia do not 
receive enough financial aid to provide for their living. The statistics do not 
tell how many asylum seekers apply for aid but it is clear that many do not. 
Whether this is because they receive money from another source or that they 
are not aware of the possibility to apply for aid from the MRA is unknown. It 
could also be that they are aware that asylum seekers are not likely to be 
granted support. However, it is unlikely that many of them find work in 
Georgia and provide for themselves that way. 
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3 Article 3 Applied to 
Readmissions to Georgia 
3.1 An Introduction to Article 3 in Asylum 
Law 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment – Article 3 of the Convention 
 
Article 3 protects people within the jurisdiction of the Convention’s state 
parties from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ill-
treatment). It is an absolute article, which means that it is an unqualifiable 
article without exceptions and that no derogations from it are allowed under 
any circumstances.108 It does not mean that something that is considered ill-
treatment in one case is always ill-treatment under other circumstances. Ill-
treatment is seen as related to but less severe than torture, and it happens that 
the Court starts considering treatment that has formerly been considered ill-
treatment as torture.109 The study of Article 3 will focus on ill-treatment, as 
something that is considered torture will always be considered ill-treatment 
as well. 
 
Ill-treatment has a very broad scope and definition. Inhuman treatment 
comprises both actual bodily injury and intense physical and mental 
suffering.110 Intent is an aggravating factor but not a necessary requirement.111 
The Court has defined degrading treatment as treatment that ‘humiliates or 
debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or 
her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable 
                                                 
108 Art. 3 and 15 of the Convention; Natasa Mavronicola & Francesco Massineo (2013): 
Relatively Absolute? The Undermining of Article 3 ECHR in Ahmad v UK. 76:3 Modern 
Law Review 589–619, p. 592. 
109 Jane McAdam (2007): Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law. 
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online March 2012. P. 141; Bernadette Rainey & 
Elizabeth Wicks & Clare Ovey (2014), p. 171. 
110 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, ECHR 2002-III, para. 52. 
111 Bernadette Rainey & Elizabeth Wicks & Clare Ovey (2014), p. 174. 
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of breaking an individual's moral and physical resistance’.112 Intent is neither 
necessary in order to find treatment degrading, but it is taken into account.113 
Punishment is when treatment takes the form of a reprimand or a penalty.114 
There have been no indications that asylum seekers readmitted to Georgia are 
in a particular risk of being subjected to any form of punishment.  
 
Ill-treatment has to attain a minimum level of severity, or a significant 
threshold, to fall within the scope of Article 3.115 Not all bodily or mental 
suffering and humiliation counts as ill-treatment. The level of severity is 
relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration 
of the treatment, its effects and in some cases the sex, age and state of health 
of the victim.116 The vulnerability inherent in being an asylum seeker is one 
such circumstance that can accentuate feelings of distress in certain 
situations.117 As has been stated above, intent is also an aggravating factor. 
 
Since Soering v. the United Kingdom118, Article 3 also obliges the state parties 
to the Convention to not deport a person if this would expose him or her to 
ill-treatment, whether the ill-treatment concerned would take place in a 
Convention state or in another state.119 According to the Court, an extradition, 
as it were in this particular case, engages the responsibility of the extraditing 
state under Article 3 ‘where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.120 
Article 3 does not entail a right to asylum, but it gives everyone within the 
jurisdiction of a state party to the Convention a right not to be deported under 
certain circumstances.  
                                                 
112 See e.g. Pretty v. the United Kingdom, para. 52. 
113 See e.g. Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, ECHR 2001-III, para. 74 and M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece, no. 30696/09, ECHR 2011, para. 220. 
114 Jane McAdam (2007), p. 142. 
115 Bernadette Rainey & Elizabeth Wicks & Clare Ovey (2014), p. 171. 
116 See e.g. Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, para. 162 and 
Hilal v. The United Kingdom, no. 45276/99, ECHR 2001-II, para. 60. 
117 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, paras. 232–233. 
118 Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161. 
119 Bernadette Rainey & Elizabeth Wicks & Clare Ovey (2014), p. 176. 
120 Soering v. the United Kingdom, para. 91. 
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Non-refoulement cases differ from other Article 3 cases in that they regard 
ill-treatment that has not yet happened. They therefore include a risk 
assessment. The applicant has to fear future ill-treatment that is severe enough 
to be protected by Article 3 and show substantial grounds that he or she faces 
a real risk of being subjected to such treatment. A real risk means a 
foreseeable risk. A mere possibility of ill-treatment is not a real risk.121 Both 
general and personal circumstances are relevant for the risk assessment.122 In 
principle, it falls to the applicant to adduce evidence that show substantial 
grounds.123 
 
3.2 Article 3 and Indirect Refoulement 
3.2.1 The Protection in Article 3 Against 
Indirect Refoulement 
Article 3 prohibits state parties from exposing people to a real risk of ill-
treatment by deporting them. In T.I. v. the United Kingdom, which regarded 
a Dublin transfer from the United Kingdom to Germany, the Court confirmed 
that this obligation persists when a state party deports a person to an 
intermediary country in which the person does not face a direct threat of ill-
treatment. A deporting state has to take into account the risk that an 
intermediary country will in turn deport the person to a country in which the 
person faces a direct threat of ill-treatment.124 After establishing that an 
applicant faces an arguable risk of ill-treatment in his country of origin, the 
assessment of the risk of indirect refoulement will focus on the risk of 
arbitrary return.125 A deportation will expose an asylum seeker to a risk of 
                                                 
121 See eg Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008, para. 131 and Daytbegova and 
Magomedova v. Austria (dec.), no. 6198/12, 4 June 2013, para. 61; Cathryn Costello 
(20122): Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an end to blind trust across the EU?. 2 Asiel & 
Migrantenrecht 83–92, p. 90. 
122 Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, 28 June 2011, para. 
216. 
123 See e.g. Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, para. 214. 
124 T.I. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 43844/98, ECHR 2000-III, p. 15, 18. 
125 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, ECHR 2012, para. 148. 
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indirect refoulement and ill-treatment if the intermediary country’s asylum 
procedure does not provide sufficient guarantees that people who fear ill-
treatment receive protection and the intermediary country carries out 
deportations.126 
 
There is a presumption that states will fulfil their obligations in national law 
and conventions.127 However, this presumption can be rebutted by showing 
deficiencies in the intermediary country’s asylum procedure. Deficiencies in 
asylum procedures vary and do not form an exhaustive list.128 The Court has 
identified many deficiencies both in the context of deportations to 
intermediary countries challenged with Article 3 and in the context of Article 
3 and Article 13 combined when the applicant has complained about the lack 
of an effective remedy to challenge a deportation that would lead to ill-
treatment. In concert, these deficiencies may render the protection for asylum 
seekers against refoulement ineffective. Any deficiency will not constitute a 
risk of indirect refoulement. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, where the 
Court found that a readmission would give rise to a risk of indirect 
refoulement, the Court concluded that the Greek asylum procedure did not 
guarantee that the applicant’s application would be seriously examined.129 
 
Some deficiencies identified in the Court’s case law relate to the access to the 
asylum procedure. Poor information, communication and infrastructure for 
accepting applications are examples of issues that may hinder asylum seekers 
that fear ill-treatment from effectively seeking protection.130 The Court has 
also found that an automatic and mechanical application of a five-day time 
limit for applying for asylum after entering the country does not conform to 
the requirements of Article 3.131 
 
                                                 
126 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 342–343; K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 
32733/08, 2 December 2008, p. 17. 
127 K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom, p. 17; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 353. 
128 Violeta Moreno-Lax (2012): Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece. 14 European Journal of Migration and Law 1–31, p. 28. 
129 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 358. 
130 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, paras. 173–182, 301. 
131 Jabari v. Turkey, no. 40035/98, ECHR 2000-VIII, paras. 16, 40. 
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Deficiencies can also relate to the quality of the status determination 
procedures. In order to give protection to those who fear ill-treatment, the 
procedures need to be of a certain quality. The people who work in the system 
have to be competent in asylum law and conduct interviews that bring 
relevant facts to light. They have to produce good decisions and judgments 
that contain information about the applicant’s individual situation and the 
country of origin and legal reasoning so that they are possible to effectively 
appeal. Asylum seekers must have access to interpretation and legal aid so 
that they can effectively make their claims.132 
 
Low recognition rates for all or certain groups of asylum seekers can be an 
indicator that their fears of ill-treatment are not given enough consideration. 
Differences in recognition rates between countries can be explained by 
chance or that the composition of asylum seekers in the countries differ. Some 
nationalities are usually entitled to protection statuses to a higher degree than 
others are. It can also be that countries with high recognition rates give 
protection to more asylum seekers than their international obligations oblige 
them to. However, in some cases the differences are too big to be explained 
by these sources of error. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court took 
note of Greece’s very low recognition rate in 2008. At first instance, 0.1 % of 
decisions granted the applicant refugee status, humanitarian status or 
subsidiary protection. The recognition rate after appeals was around 4 %.133 
In European countries with a comparable number of claimants, the 
recognition rate at first instance was between 25 % and 36 % at the same 
time.134 This fact alone makes it very likely that many asylum seekers who 
faced a real risk of ill-treatment and applied for asylum in Greece did not 
receive protection. 
 
If an intermediary country that is party to the Convention does not award 
protection to an asylum seeker who faces a real risk of ill-treatment, the 
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asylum seeker still has the possibility to lodge an application to the Court. 
The Court has the power to stop a deportation order according to Rule 39 until 
the lodged application has been assessed. If asylum seekers have effective 
access to this procedure in the intermediary country, deportations there will 
not give rise to a risk of indirect refoulement. Poor access to legal counsel and 
practice of unlawful deportations are issues that may render this procedure 
inaccessible.135 
 
3.2.2 The Risk of Indirect Refoulement Through 
Georgia 
The time limit for applying for asylum in Georgia after an illegal border 
crossing does not seem to be applied in practice and therefore does not hinder 
people from applying for asylum. It could be that the rule would be applied 
differently in readmission cases when the breach of the rule is all the more 
obvious. However, the authorities do not seem intent to apply it and would 
probably have done so if they had been. 
 
Asylum seekers in Georgia have access to an asylum procedure where their 
claims are seriously assessed by staff dedicated to work with asylum law. 
Decision makers base their decisions on individual facts provided by 
interviews that mostly last several hours as well as country of origin 
information and the decision makers are trained in asylum law. The asylum 
procedure at the MRA level certainly has issues, but it can in no way be 
compared to what the situation was like in Greece at the time of M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece. The deficiencies at court level seem to be more serious, 
but only cases that have been rejected by the MRA will be appealed and 
thereby end up in court. The protection afforded by Georgian legislation and 
practice is not illusory and there is therefore no general real risk that asylum 
seekers who fear ill-treatment will not receive a protection status in Georgia 
and thus be unprotected from refoulement. 
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A lack in the study in Chapter 2 is that it does not reveal if the Georgian 
asylum procedure pays sufficient attention to particular protection needs that 
for instance stem from gender-based violence or ill-treatment of sexual 
minorities. 
 
If one compares Georgia’s recognition rate in 2014 to that in the EU, they are 
very similar. The recognition rate in Georgia at first instance in 2014 was 37.7 
% whereas the recognition rate in the EU as a whole was 45 %.136 The 
composition of asylum seekers in Georgia is of course not the same as in the 
EU, but these general statistics do say something about whether the Georgian 
asylum procedure generally affords protection to asylum seekers to the same 
extent as the asylum procedures in the EU.  
 
The situation for certain nationalities is a more serious concern. Most Iranians 
who seek asylum in Georgia, including those who fear ill-treatment in Iran, 
will have their asylum applications rejected because of security reasons. 
Moreover, those negative decisions cannot be appealed effectively. Iranians 
who fear ill-treatment will therefore not be awarded a protection status in 
Georgia. 
 
There seems to be a gap in national legislation prohibiting non-refoulement 
that according to the letter of the law leaves rejected asylum seekers who fear 
ill-treatment that cannot be considered a threat to their life or health out of 
protection. This does not necessarily mean that there has been an intention to 
exclude those asylum seekers from the scope of the obligation of non-
refoulement. Georgia’s international obligations still prohibit the deportation 
of those asylum seekers. That the MRA assesses the asylum applications of 
asylum seekers who will have their application rejected because of security 
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concerns shows that Georgian authorities are aware of the need to not deport 
them. Even if this legislative gap fitted a rejected Iranian asylum seeker who 
was considered a security threat to Georgia, it does not seem likely that 
Georgia would not recognise the need to not deport him. 
 
At the moment, no deficiency in Georgia’s asylum procedure, however 
serious, will translate into a risk of indirect refoulement as Georgia does not 
detain or deport rejected asylum seekers. If the will to change practice arises 
in the future, Georgia’s lack of readmission agreements with most countries 
of origin will still make refoulement unlikely. Readmission agreements are 
not necessary to carry out deportations, especially if the deportee fears ill-
treatment from state authorities. The lack of readmission agreements is 
however a major obstacle to deportation in many cases. That the Georgian 
authorities have constructed and started to utilise a detention centre for 
foreigners shows that there is an intent to deport foreigners in the future. 
However, it is still too early to say how many deportations, especially 
deportations of rejected asylum seekers, the new systems to identify irregular 
migrants, the new detention centre and the will to conclude more readmission 
agreements will actually result in. 
 
There are concerns about some nationalities not receiving a protection status 
in Georgia. However, as Georgia does not presently detain or deport rejected 
asylum seekers, those concerns do not translate into concerns about indirect 
refoulement. There is a presumption that Georgia will live up to its 
international obligations, including the obligation of non-refoulement. No 
substantial grounds have been shown in this graduate thesis to believe that 
this is not the case. 
 
3.3 Living Conditions 
Article 3 of the Convention was originally not applied to situations in which 
the suffering concerned was a result of poor living conditions and the 
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signatories of the Convention most likely neither intended it to be.137 Article 
3 is mostly associated with ill-treatment suffered at the hands of states or state 
officials and the obligations that stem from Article 3 are mainly negative. In 
concert with Article 1, Article 3 also contains positive procedural obligations 
to investigate ill-treatment of citizens conducted by private individuals and 
substantive positive obligations to prevent ill-treatment conducted by private 
individuals in certain cases.138 The Court has however been reluctant to apply 
the Convention in a way that creates social rights. Regardless of their severity, 
some inhuman or degrading situations simply do not fall within the scope of 
Article 3, creating obligations for states. The Court has made clear that the 
Convention does not obligate states to provide everyone within their 
jurisdiction with a home139 and that there is no general obligation to provide 
economic support to refugees.140 However, the latter statement might not be 
true anymore. As the Court stated in Airey v. Ireland, ‘Whilst the Convention 
sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have 
implications of a social or economic nature.’ From time to time, the 
Convention may therefore bring the Court into the sphere of social and 
economic rights anyway.141 
 
3.3.1 State Responsibility for Inhuman or 
Degrading Living Conditions 
States are definitely capable of causing poverty that amounts to inhuman or 
degrading treatment. This was found to be the case in Sufi and Elmi v. the 
United Kingdom, where the Court found that exposing the applicants to living 
conditions in IDP camps in Somalia by deporting them would amount to a 
violation of Article 3. The Court found that the parties of the conflict in 
Somalia were mainly responsible for the living conditions that the IDPs were 
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suffering in the camps. The basis for applying Article 3 when a state does not 
directly cause inhuman or degrading living conditions is more dubious. A 
passive state, like Georgia in this case, can hardly be accused of causing the 
poverty of asylum seekers that live within its jurisdiction. An obligation to 
provide financial support under these circumstances is purely social. 
Nevertheless, the Court has not completely refrained from applying Article 3 
even then. 
 
The first time that Article 3 put a stop to a deportation because of poor living 
conditions was in D. v. the United Kingdom.142 The case concerned an AIDS 
patient in a terminal phase of his illness with no evident support available to 
him in his home country. A deportation would result in the abrupt withdrawal 
of his support at a critical moment and leave him in a deplorable condition in 
his home country.143 The Court found that even if the harm would not emanate 
‘from the intentional acts or omissions of public authorities or non-State 
bodies, but instead from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of sufficient 
resources’,144 due to the compelling humanitarian considerations at stake, and 
the very exceptional circumstances of the case, a deportation would breach 
Article 3.145 The Court has not found these circumstances to be at hand in any 
subsequent case.146 The D test involves a truly individual evaluation of an 
applicant’s circumstances and it is not likely that it could be found applicable 
where general issues are concerned.  
 
The line of case law introduced in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece has had a 
much more profound effect. In this landmark case, the Court found that the 
living conditions of homeless destitute asylum seekers in Greece amounted 
to inhuman and degrading treatment and that Greece was responsible under 
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Article 3 for their situation.147 Moreover, it also found that Belgium had 
breached Article 3 by deporting and exposing M.S.S. to those conditions, and 
thereby established the extra-territorial effect of this responsibility, at least 
regarding deportations to other Convention states.148 There were no 
exceptional circumstances in the case. The Court simply stated that 
substantial grounds had been shown to believe that M.S.S. would be subjected 
to ill-treatment if returned to Greece, and thus applied the standard test used 
in non-refoulement cases.149 The Court discussed bureaucratic obstacles for 
asylum seekers that obstructed them from accessing the labour market and 
thereby providing for themselves.150 The Court could have argued that this 
caused the asylum seekers’ inhuman and degrading living conditions,151 but 
instead argued that certain circumstances in the case gave rise to a 
responsibility for Greece to provide for the basic needs of its asylum 
seekers.152 In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the Court confirmed that direct state 
responsibility could arise for inhuman or degrading living conditions, even 
when those were not caused by the state. 
 
To explain its reasoning, the Court cited itself from Budina v. Russia153 where 
it had stated that “State responsibility [under Article 3] could arise for 
‘treatment’ where an applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State 
support, found herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of 
serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity”.154 The Court 
also made clear that this responsibility does not arise in relation to anyone 
who fits the criteria above. The Court attached considerable importance to the 
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fact that asylum seekers constitute a particularly vulnerable group. Therefore, 
the Court awarded them special protection.155 The Court also attached 
considerable importance to the existence of positive law protecting the rights 
of asylum seekers, and especially the Reception Directive. 
 
The finding that a passive state can be held responsible for the inhuman or 
degrading living conditions of asylum seekers is a new development in the 
Court’s case law and unsurprisingly surrounded with many uncertainties. The 
importance of the finding that asylum seekers constitute a vulnerable group, 
the importance of the breach of the Reception Directive and how to interpret 
the terms state indifference and state dependence that appear in Budina v. 
Russia will be discussed below. A discussion on how the Court has judged 
the severity of living conditions and what kind of living conditions states can 
be held responsible for will follow as well. 
 
3.3.1.1 Limiting Responsibility to Vulnerable Groups 
The classification of asylum seekers as a particularly vulnerable group, and 
as such a group in need of special protection, seems to have been essential for 
the finding that states could be held responsible for their inhuman or 
degrading living conditions.156 Vulnerability is a concept that has also been 
applied to Roma, HIV-patients and mentally disabled.157 Dissenting Judge 
Sajó, later supported by Marc Bossuyt, criticized the use of the concept in the 
case of asylum seekers because asylum seekers are not a homogenous group 
and not treated as such.158 The concept of vulnerability is a heuristic device 
that grants groups an advanced level of protection as a whole.159 Individual 
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circumstances are relevant when the Court assesses severity and the risk that 
a readmission will expose a person to ill-treatment. However, state 
responsibility for inhuman or degrading living conditions seems to arise in 
relation to particularly vulnerable groups. 
 
The Court based its decision in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece to consider 
asylum seekers particularly vulnerable and award them special protection on 
the existence of both international and other documents, especially the 
Receptions Directive, that have been adopted to protect asylum seekers.160 
This is an example of how the Court evolutively interprets the Convention 
and adds to its substance by borrowing from law and practice throughout the 
Convention territory.161 Article 3 should be interpreted consistently in regard 
to all state parties. All state parties should therefore be responsible for the 
living conditions of asylum seekers as a particularly vulnerable group. 
However, it is not clear if asylum seekers would necessarily be classified as 
a particularly vulnerable group in all states. According to Peroni and Timmer, 
the Court in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece seems to have derived the 
particular vulnerability of asylum seekers from both issues that were 
particular to Greece and issues that are general for all or most asylum 
seekers.162 The issues particular to Greece, and in subsequent cases to Italy, 
were the same issues that made the living conditions of asylum seekers 
inhuman or degrading. In effect, to show empirically that asylum seekers face 
poor living conditions on a large scale in a certain state is to show that they 
are particularly vulnerable to poor conditions there. If a study shows that 
asylum seekers readmitted to Georgia face a real risk of ending up in 
destitution and homelessness, it is very likely that they would be considered 
a particularly vulnerable group there in this regard. 
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3.3.1.2 The Role of Positive Law 
Positive law was important for the Court’s evolutive interpretation of Article 
3 in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. However, the importance of positive law 
for finding a breach of Article 3 for living conditions may be even greater. In 
S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, the Court stated that Greece breached Article 
3 in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece not only through inaction, but also 
because of ‘its failure to comply with its positive obligations under both 
European and domestic legislation to provide reception facilities to asylum 
seekers’.163 The Court has made similar statements expressing the importance 
of breached positive law in the other judgments that relate to living 
conditions.164 This has led some authors to argue that the Court seems to treat 
the breach of positive law, notably the Reception Directive, as a requirement 
for finding living conditions to be in breach of Article 3.165 Some authors have 
gone further and argued that the importance of the Reception Directive in the 
Court’s case law means that the judgments possibly only have clear 
implications for the responsibility of EU member states.166 This would create 
a situation of different human rights standards within the Convention area, 
something that would usually require that a number of Convention states sign 
a protocol to the Convention. 
 
To assign critical importance to the existence of positive law in order to find 
that living conditions breach Article 3 equates to adding a legality test to 
Article 3. As several authors have said, this would be inappropriate.167 If 
positive law strictly defined the scope of Article 3, it would no longer be 
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absolute. According to Clayton, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece in its most 
reasonable interpretation prohibits all state parties to the Convention from 
leaving asylum seekers in absolute destitution. EU member states that fail to 
fulfil the obligations in the Reception Directive as well as Convention states 
that have no similar obligations can all be held responsible for the inhuman 
or degrading living conditions of asylum seekers.168 This view is shared by 
the author.  
 
Clayton’s alternative interpretation of the importance that the Court attached 
to the Reception Directive in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece is that the breach 
of it added to the frustration and suffering of M.S.S.169 That the breach of the 
Reception Directive is more frustrating than the lack of it in the first place is 
highly debatable. There are much more important reasons as to why poverty 
is experienced as inhuman or degrading. To attach importance to the breach 
of positive law when assessing the severity of poor living conditions would 
be to circumvent the absoluteness of Article 3. The importance of positive 
law in finding that living conditions constitute ill-treatment must mainly be 
that it legitimises treating asylum seekers as a particularly vulnerable group, 
and as such a group that needs special protection.  
 
3.3.1.3 Dependence on State Support and State 
Indifference 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and subsequent case law, the Court has cited 
Budina v. Russia, where it said that state responsibility “could arise for 
‘treatment’ where an applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State 
support, found herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of 
serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity”.170 What the 
Court means with dependence on state support and official indifference and 
if they are particularly important circumstances or just circumstances that 
affected the severity of Budina’s particular case is unclear from the statement 
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and the Court’s case law. As the Court cites this statement in full in the 
general principles summaries of many of the cases that relate to the M.S.S. 
line of case law, the statement merits some scrutiny. 
 
What is clear from the Court’s case law is that ill-treatment relating to living 
conditions does not presuppose a complete dependence on state support if by 
that one means a legal, physical or mental inability to provide for oneself. In 
the non-refoulement context, the Court does not discuss asylum seekers’ 
ability to provide for themselves as much as the likelihood that asylum 
seekers will end up unemployed and in need of support. In M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece, the Court found that it was not a reasonable option for the 
applicant to provide for himself. This was partly because of bureaucratic 
obstacles that made the labour market inaccessible to asylum seekers, but also 
because the applicant did not speak Greek, did not have a network and 
because of the generally unfavourable economic climate in Greece.171 In 
Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the fact that asylum seekers were mostly entitled to 
work in Italy did not preclude the application of Article 3. The Court noted 
that asylum seekers could not find private accommodation as the economic 
situation made it very hard to find work172, and went on to find that deporting 
the Tarakhel family to Italy would breach Article 3 due to the risk that they 
might face inhuman or degrading living conditions there. In A.M.E. v. the 
Netherlands, the Court noted that A.M.E. was an ‘able young man’, but did 
not rule out that the living conditions he faced in Italy could have amounted 
to ill-treatment if they had been severe enough to fall within the scope of 
Article 3.173  
 
If dependence means nothing else than need of support, the question if an 
asylum seeker will find himself in circumstances wholly dependent on state 
support or not if deported seems to be subsumed under the general question 
if it is foreseeable or not that he or she will be subjected to inhuman or 
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degrading living conditions. For example, an asylum seeker who possesses 
the means to provide for himself does not need state support and will not risk 
inhuman or degrading living conditions if deported. This is probably how it 
works in theory at least. In practice, the Court does not seem to have taken 
much interest in the individual financial situations of asylum seekers risking 
deportation and their actual dependence on state support. Perhaps it considers 
that it would be too demanding to ask asylum seekers to show that they cannot 
provide for themselves and that such a demand would render the new 
protection it has granted them ineffective. Nevertheless, this has been 
criticised by dissenters in both Tarakhel v. Switzerland and M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece.174  
 
State indifference can be an aggravating factor that make living conditions 
more degrading and severe. State indifference is probably a factor in most 
cases where living conditions have become severe enough to be considered 
inhuman or degrading. However, it is not necessarily so. In Tarakhel v. Italy 
the Court noted that UNHCR had welcomed the Italian authorities’ efforts to 
improve reception conditions.175 The Italian government had therefore at least 
not been as indifferent as the Court had considered the Greek government to 
be a few years earlier. 
 
If state indifference is instead interpreted as an independent requirement, it 
seems to imply that a state that is responsible for inhuman or degrading 
conditions through its inaction cannot be held responsible for them if it is not 
indifferent towards them. Interpreted in this way, the requirement seems to 
resemble a requirement of due diligence or a requirement that states take 
reasonable steps to prevent inhuman or degrading living conditions. Laurens 
Lavrysen has put forward an interpretation to that end, even if not based on 
the statement from Budina v. Russia, and stated that the importance of the 
breach of the Reception Directive could be that it showed that Greece had not 
taken reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment.176 This interpretation would 
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be reasonable if the responsibility to provide for asylum seekers was defined 
as an implied positive obligation. Those obligations are not absolute, and 
states are only required to take reasonable steps to fulfil them. However, the 
Court’s case law does not support this interpretation. Implied positive 
obligations are usually derived from Article 1 and a substantive provision in 
concert.177 The Court does not refer to Article 1 in any of the judgments where 
the M.S.S. line of reasoning is applied. Moreover, the Court does not discuss 
whether the efforts of the Greek or Italian authorities to increase their 
reception capacity and improve its condition have been reasonable or not. As 
the author sees it, there is no reason to consider the obligation to prevent 
inhuman or degrading living conditions for asylum seekers as anything else 
than absolute.  
 
3.3.1.4 The Nature and Severity of Poor Living 
Conditions 
The notion of living conditions is vague. Before M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, the Court did not consider abandoning destitute homeless asylum 
seekers a breach of Article 3. Now it does, but does that mean in principle 
that states can be held responsible for everything that can be defined as 
inhuman or degrading living conditions? The interpretation of this vague 
notion defines the width of the social responsibilities that can be interpreted 
from Article 3. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, it was the applicant’s 
inability to cater for his most basic needs that constituted ill-treatment. These 
basic needs were food, hygiene and a place to live.178 In Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland, that regarded a family with children, the potential split up of the 
family or that the children would not be accommodated in a facility that was 
adapted to their age constituted ill-treatment.179 
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Asylum seekers who have challenged readmissions to Italy have on several 
occasions also argued that a readmission would amount to a violation of 
Article 3 because it would deprive them of sufficient mental healthcare. The 
Court has found on all occasions that there were no grounds to believe that 
Italy would not recognise the vulnerability of the mentally ill and treat them 
accordingly. It has not clearly stated if a failure to do so would create a 
situation that amounted to ill-treatment, but said that it might.180 It could be 
that like children, other vulnerable subgroups of asylum seekers are entitled 
to specially adapted reception conditions through Article 3. The notion of 
living conditions does not seem to limit the scope of ill-treatment to the non-
fulfilment of basic needs in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, but probably 
works to create a wider range of potential social responsibilities, at least for 
some particularly vulnerable groups of asylum seekers. 
 
The scope of Article 3 is moreover limited to treatment that attains a minimum 
level of severity. The assessment of the minimum level of severity is relative 
and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, 
age and state of health of the victim.181 Some treatment is inhuman or 
degrading to some but not to others. In this way, Article 3 is subjective. The 
threshold for ill-treatment is certainly lower for children in many cases, and 
especially asylum seeking children, who the Court has pointed out as 
extremely vulnerable.182 The same is true for asylum seekers, because of the 
likely traumatic experiences that many will have endured in the past.183 
 
There have been no indications in this study that the conditions at the 
Martkopi reception centre are unacceptable in general. Further study could 
question its capacity to deal with children, mentally ill or other particularly 
                                                 
180 Abubeker v. Austria and Italy (dec.), no. 73874/11, 18 June 2013, paras. 70–71; 
Daytbegova and Magomedova v. Austria, paras. 67–70; Halimi v. Austria and Italy, paras. 
70–72. 
181 See, e.g. Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, ECHR 2000-XI, para. 91 and M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece, para. 219, and Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 94. 
182 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, paras. 99, 119. 
183 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 232. 
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vulnerable groups. However, the following discussion will be about how the 
Court has assessed the severity of destitution and homelessness.  
 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court found that the living conditions 
for asylum seekers in Greece were severe enough to preclude even 
readmissions of English speaking men like M.S.S. Like many other asylum 
seekers, M.S.S. had lived a destitute life on the street. The Court noted that 
he was unable to cater for his most basic needs: food, hygiene and a place to 
live and that he lived in an ever-present fear of being attacked and robbed.184 
This had ‘without doubt, aroused in him feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority 
capable of inducing desperation’. The Court concluded that these conditions 
combined with their long duration and the lack of hope for improvement had 
attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3.185 
M.S.S.’ situation, which the Court had compared to that of many others, had 
already lasted about one and a half years by that time. Quite importantly, the 
Court stated that the Greek authorities could substantially have alleviated the 
suffering of M.S.S. if they had examined his asylum application promptly.186 
If M.S.S.’ situation had not lasted as long as it did, at some point it might not 
yet have constituted inhuman or degrading treatment. 
 
The Court has stated on multiple occasions that there is no general real risk 
that asylum seekers readmitted to Italy will be exposed to inhuman or 
degrading living conditions.187 In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the Court stated 
that the situation in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece differed from the one in 
Italy in that the reception capacity in Greece was much less sufficient and 
conditions of extreme poverty much more widespread.188 Judging from the 
Court’s own calculations, there seems to have been a foreseeable risk that 
asylum seekers readmitted to Italy would end up without accommodation, at 
                                                 
184 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 254. 
185 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 263. 
186 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 262. 
187 Halimi v. Austria and Italy (dec.), no. 53852/11, 18 June 2013, para. 68; Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland, para. 115; Daytbegova and Magomedova v. Austria, para. 66. 
188 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 114. 
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least for some time.189 However, a bigger reception capacity in Italy and a 
faster and more functional asylum procedure meant that it was not likely that 
asylum seekers in Italy would remain homeless for as long as was the case in 
Greece at the time of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and moreover, their 
situation would not be as uncertain and hopeless.190 That might be the reason 
why the Court has not considered that everyone readmitted to Italy face a real 
risk of being subjected to living conditions severe enough to be considered 
ill-treatment. 
 
As has been stated above, child asylum seekers or families with children 
seeking asylum and perhaps other groups of vulnerable asylum seekers as 
well need special reception conditions. Conditions that ‘create...a situation of 
stress and anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences’ for children are 
not compatible with Article 3.191 Insalubrious, overcrowded or violent 
conditions that are not severe enough to be inhuman or degrading for adults 
can be considered ill-treatment for minors.192 It seems unlikely that the Court 
would consider exposing children to a real risk of even shorter periods of 
homelessness and destitution compatible with Article 3. 
 
3.3.2 Readmissions and Living Conditions in 
Georgia 
The following assessment will be based on the premises that a breach of the 
Reception Directive is not critical in order to hold states responsible for 
asylum seeker’s living conditions and that asylum seekers should be classified 
as a vulnerable group in Georgia. If these premises are accepted, what is to 
be established is if there are substantial grounds to believe that a readmission 
to Georgia would expose asylum seekers to a real risk of being subjected to 
living conditions that are severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3. 
As the Court adds to its case law, the premises may well turn out to be wrong. 
                                                 
189 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 110. 
190 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 108. 
191 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 119. 
192 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 120–121. 
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With no organisations reporting about the situation of asylum seekers outside 
of the Martkopi reception centre, nothing certain can be said about the 
conditions they find themselves in.193 There is no reason to believe that 
unsupported asylum seekers fare better in Georgia than they do in Italy or 
Greece. Unemployment in Georgia is ripe and it is likely that many asylum 
seekers there live in very poor material conditions that are similar to the 
conditions that asylum seekers lived in in Greece in 2010. What can also be 
said is that unlike in Greece, the asylum procedure in Georgia is not 
dysfunctional and therefore not as degrading as the Greek one was. Asylum 
seekers in Georgia will receive a decision on their asylum application and a 
large minority will receive a positive answer. However, one to one and a half 
years of waiting for a final decision is still a substantial amount of time. 
 
The Court has taken on an activist role in regard to asylum seekers in Europe 
and awarded them special protection. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece added 
state responsibilities for asylum seekers’ living conditions and Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland clarified that their extent was wider than many had believed. 
Tarakhel v. Switzerland could still become a high-water mark in the Court’s 
protection of asylum seekers, but as of now, nothing indicates that the Court 
is retracting from its new case law. In material terms and the length of the 
destitute conditions suffered, the situation for unsupported asylum seekers in 
Georgia probably resembles the situation described in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece more than the one that has been described in cases regarding Italy. On 
the other hand, the Georgian asylum procedure is not degrading like the Greek 
one was in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. The severity assessment 
undoubtedly allows the Court to relativize a lot and in this case, it could 
choose to go the way it finds more suitable. The author believes that the Court 
would find homelessness and destitution that is likely to last for up to one and 
a half years severe enough to be considered ill-treatment in the case of asylum 
seekers, regardless of the qualities of the asylum procedure. That it would 
consider leaving children in such conditions ill-treatment is almost certain. 
                                                 
193 Representatives of UNAG (2015). Interview. 
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Whether ill-treatment has been proven in the case of Georgia is another 
question. Except the requests for aid to the MRA, there are no concrete 
grounds to show that asylum seekers in Georgia are living in severe 
conditions. However, by drawing parallels to the situation in other countries, 
one can conclude that it is likely that a sizeable part of the asylum seekers 
who live in Georgia live in conditions that are severe enough to fall within 
the scope of Article 3. The author believes that in the case of a small country, 
where civil society is not as resourceful and developed as in the EU and where 
asylum seekers receive very limited coverage by international and national 
organisations, the Court could accept the absence of state support as sufficient 
evidence for the severity of asylum seekers’ living conditions.  
 
There is a glaring discrepancy between the capacity of Georgia’s reception 
centre and the amount of asylum cases that are being processed at the 
moment. The MRA had a backlog of 1257 cases at the turn of the year and 
only 60 places available in the Martkopi reception centre.194 There is therefore 
clearly a real risk that any adult asylum seeker readmitted to Georgia will face 
inhuman or degrading living conditions there. 
 
Financial support and access to the reception centre in Martkopi is prioritised 
for families. It also looks like families receive aid from the MRA to a higher 
degree than single asylum seekers. However, the statistics do not show if 
those who receive support are protection status holders or asylum seekers and 
neither how many families are denied financial support for accommodation. 
Regarding children facing deportation, the Court no longer seems to require 
that substantial grounds are shown to prove a risk of ill-treatment. In Tarakhel 
v. Switzerland, the readmission of the Tarakhel family was stopped because 
serious doubts had been raised about the Italian reception system’s capacity 
to receive them as a family and because Switzerland had not received 
sufficient guarantees that the family would be properly received in Italy.195 
                                                 
194 UNHCR (2015), annex table 10; Representative of the MRA (2015). Interview. 
195 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 115. 
 50 
The burden of providing evidence that raises serious doubts is certainly lower 
than the burden to provide substantial grounds. The author believes that 
serious doubts have been raised about the capacity of Georgia to adequately 
receive children, and readmissions of families to Georgia would therefore be 
contrary to Article 3. According to Costello and Mouzourakis, there is no 
reason to believe that Tarakhel v. Switzerland only has implications for the 
burden of evidence in non-refoulement cases concerning children.196 If that is 
so, it has not yet had an impact on the Court’s case law.  
                                                 
196 Cathryn Costello & Minos Mouzourakis (2014): Reflections on reading Tarakhel: Is 
’How Bad is Bad Enough’ Good Enough? 10 Asiel & Migrantenrecht 404–411, p. 410. 
 51 
4 Conclusion 
The aim of this graduate thesis has been to establish if there are substantial 
grounds to believe that all or certain groups of asylum seekers readmitted to 
Georgia today, without first having their asylum claims assessed thoroughly, 
would face a real risk of ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3. 
 
The first risk of ill-treatment that merited study was the risk of indirect 
refoulement that was studied in Chapters 2.1 and 3.2.  No general deficiencies 
were found that put into question Georgia’s capability to seriously assess 
asylum applications. However, the study failed to assess if Georgia 
competently assesses particular protection needs. This merits further study. 
One issue that was revealed was the practice to deny Iranians and possibly 
certain other nationalities protection statuses because of security concerns. 
This raises doubts as to how well protected these nationalities are from 
refoulement. According to the MRA, Georgia would not deport them if they 
feared ill-treatment. The fact that possible protection needs are made clear in 
the decisions even if the asylum seeker concerned is rejected because of 
security reasons supports this statement. 
 
The question if that is correct is not very important today, as Georgia does not 
detain or deport rejected asylum seekers. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
there are substantial grounds to believe that people readmitted to Georgia 
would face a risk of indirect refoulement. As Georgia continues to build its 
capacity to identify and detain foreigners staying illegally in Georgia, this 
could of course change. 
 
The second risk of ill-treatment studied was the risk that people readmitted to 
Georgia would face poor detention conditions studied in Chapter 2.2. This 
risk was immediately dismissed because asylum seekers are not detained in 
Georgia and because there are no indications that foreigners that are detained 
in Georgia are ill-treated. 
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The third risk of ill-treatment studied was the risk that asylum seekers 
readmitted to Georgia would face living conditions severe enough to fall 
within the scope of Article 3. This was studied in Chapters 2.3 and 3.3. That 
passive states can be held responsible for not providing decent living 
conditions for asylum seekers is a new development and the case law is 
therefore riddled with uncertainty. This merited a more extensive study of the 
Court’s new case law, but the conclusion is still very uncertain.  
 
The main uncertainty regards the requirements for applying Article 3 to living 
conditions. The author, like Clayton, argues that the Court has made clear that 
Article 3 is in principle applicable to the inhuman or degrading living 
conditions of asylum seekers if they are considered to be a particularly 
vulnerable group. What is then required in order to find that a readmission 
would breach Article 3 is simply that substantial grounds be shown to believe 
that there is a real risk that asylum seekers will be subjected to conditions that 
are severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3 if returned. Some 
authors have argued that the Court seems to treat the breach of positive law 
or even the breach of the Reception Directive as a requirement for finding a 
breach of Article 3. According to the author, any interpretation that gives the 
Convention different meanings within and outside of the EU or challenges 
the absoluteness of Article 3 in any other way has to be flawed.  
 
The graduate thesis then assessed if there were substantial grounds to believe 
that asylum seekers readmitted to Georgia would risk being subjected to 
living conditions amounting to ill-treatment. The general conditions for 
homeless and destitute asylum seekers in Georgia were found to probably be 
slightly better than the living conditions described in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece. Nevertheless, the author believes that if the Court would accept them 
proven, it would find the conditions severe enough to fall within the scope of 
Article 3. Moreover, it was found that the conditions are likely enough to say 
that every asylum readmitted to Georgia risks being subjected to them. 
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It was also found that conditions of destitution and homelessness are certainly 
severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3 when asylum seeking 
families are concerned. It was found that serious doubts had been raised as to 
the capacity of the Georgian reception system to receive asylum seeking 
families and that readmissions of asylum seeking families would therefore 
not be compatible with Article 3. There was not enough information gathered 
regarding the situation for other particularly vulnerable groups of asylum 
seekers in Georgia. How Article 3 would be applied in their case was 
therefore not thoroughly studied either. 
 
In sum, the graduate thesis concluded that there are probably substantial 
grounds to believe that all asylum seekers readmitted to Georgia would face 
a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment because of Georgia’s severely 
insufficient reception capacity and the risk that asylum seekers may end up in 
destitution and homelessness. It concluded that it is much more probable that 
readmissions of asylum seeking families would constitute a breach of Article 
3 for the same reasons. However, the conclusion is uncertain as the Court’s 
case law regarding the application of Article 3 to inhuman or degrading living 
conditions is still unclear. 
 
4.1 Concluding Remarks 
One of the issues with applying Article 3 on mainly social issues is its 
absoluteness. In theory, Article 3 sets absolute standards for the social 
responsibilities of states. In contrast, Article 11 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that is not enforceable for most state 
parties, asks the state parties to ‘take appropriate steps’ to ensure the 
realization of the right to adequate living conditions, ‘recognizing to this 
effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free 
consent’. It makes sense to not construct international social human rights as 
absolute articles because states have a very varying capacity to provide social 
welfare to its citizens. 
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The application of Article 3 to combat social injustice might make at least 
moral sense in cases where certain particularly vulnerable groups of people 
are much more dependent on and have much more limited access to social 
welfare than the majority. It might make less sense in a country like Georgia 
that has a very limited state budget and several other very serious social issues 
to deal with.197 Georgia is a poor country with a GDP (PPP) per capita 
equalling that of Morocco and Guatemala and begging children and disabled 
are not an uncommon sight in its capital Tbilisi. Even if Georgia, with a lot 
of international support, has put much effort into providing adequate housing 
to its sizeable community of internally displaced people, and could probably 
manage to do the same to its asylum seekers if supported, it might not be very 
constructive to brand the failure to do so a human rights violation. 
 
This however, is not important to the application of Article 3, as it is absolute. 
Whether something that falls within the scope of Article 3 should be 
considered ill-treatment or not depends on its severity, which depends on all 
the circumstances of the case. This gives the Court a possibility to relativize 
a lot, which could be used to find living conditions inhuman or degrading in 
some countries and not inhuman or degrading in others. It is hard to see that 
for instance relatively poorer surroundings or a relatively poorer state would 
make a decisive difference to how an asylum seeker experiences his or her 
living conditions. It remains to see how the Court will manage to apply Article 
3 to social issues in states with a very varied degree of affluence. It would be 
unfortunate if it relativized circumstances to such a degree that in effect, it 
split up the degree of human rights protection in the states within its 
jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
197 The potentially strange implications of how M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece gives priority 
to some welfare expenses was brought up by Marc Bossuyt in Marc Bossuyt (2012): The 
Court of Strasbourg Acting as an Asylum Court. 8 European Constitutional Law Review 
203–245, footnote 98.  
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